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Abstract. The increasing threat of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks targeting 
Smart City systems impose unprecedented challenges in terms of service 
availability, especially against centralized control platforms due to their single 
point of failure issue. The European ARTEMIS co-funded project ACCUS 
(Adaptive Cooperative Control in Urban (sub)Systems) is focused on a 
centralized Integration and Coordination Platform (ICP) for urban subsystems 
to enable real-time collaborative applications across them and optimize their 
combined performance in Smart Cities. Hence, any outage of the ACCUS ICP, 
due to DoS attacks, can severely affect not only the interconnected subsystems 
but also the citizens. Consequently, it is of utmost importance for ACCUS ICP 
to be protected with the appropriate defense mechanisms against these attacks. 
Towards this direction, the measurement of the performance degradation of the 
attacked ICP server can be used for the selection of the most appropriate 
defense mechanisms. However, the suitable metrics are required to be defined. 
Therefore, this paper models and analyzes the impact of DoS attacks on the 
queue management temporal performance of the ACCUS ICP server in terms of 
system delay by using queueing theory. 
Keywords: Smart City Security, Denial of Service Attacks, Security Modeling, 
Queueing Theory. 
1   Introduction 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are one of the oldest and most serious threats on the 
Internet. The main objective of DoS attacks is to prevent legitimate access to services 
of a target machine by overwhelming its resources (e.g., CPU, memory, network 
bandwidth). Essentially, DoS attacks are a type of attacks against availability of the 
targeted machine, which is an important security property for modern Internet-based 
systems. There are two main categories of DoS attacks: network layer DoS attacks 
and application layer DoS attacks [1], [2]. Network layer DoS attacks are carried out 
at the network layer and they attempt to overwhelm the network resources of the 
targeted victim with bandwidth-consuming assaults such as TCP SYN, ICMP or UDP 
flooding attacks. On the other hand, application layer DoS attacks are more 
sophisticated attacks that exploit specific characteristics and vulnerabilities of 
application layer protocols (e.g., HTTP, DNS, VoIP or SMTP) and applications 
running on the victim system in order to deplete its resources [1].  
Specifically in the case of Smart Cities, the effect of both categories of DoS attacks 
on any platform providing centralized control in these environments can be 
catastrophic since any unavailability of the platform (single point of failure) would 
plunge the cities into chaos. For example, the ongoing European research project 
ACCUS (Adaptive Cooperative Control in Urban (sub) Systems) [3] aims to provide 
a centralized Integration and Coordination Platform (ICP) for urban systems to 
leverage real-time collaborative applications across them. Furthermore, ACCUS is 
defining an adaptive and cooperative control architecture and the corresponding 
algorithms for urban subsystems in order to optimize their combined performance in 
Smart Cities. Thus, it becomes clear that DoS attacks on the ACCUS ICP server can 
jeopardize the safety and well-being of the ACCUS citizens. Additionally, there are 
huge incentives for cyber-criminals to launch DoS attacks against Smart Cities, like 
ACCUS City, ranging from financial gain to cyberwarfare.  
Taking into consideration all the above mentioned, it is of utmost importance for 
ACCUS ICP to be protected with the appropriate defense mechanisms against these 
types of attacks in order to provide reliable and secure services to citizens. Towards 
this direction, the study and analysis of the impact of DoS attacks on the performance 
of the ICP server can play a critical role. Due to the fact that the impact of DoS 
attacks on the victim’s performance is a key characteristic of them, the measurement 
of the performance degradation of the ACCUS ICP server imposed by these attacks 
can be used by the ACCUS ICP city planners to evaluate existing defense 
mechanisms. Then, it will enable them to select the most appropriate ones. However, 
the appropriate metrics are required to be defined firstly. Therefore, in this paper, as 
an initial step towards the definition of the appropriate metrics, we model and analyze 
the impact of DoS attacks on the queue management temporal performance within the 
ACCUS ICP server in terms of system delay by using queueing theory.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 demonstrates a scenario of 
ACCUS ICP server under a DoS attack. In Section 3, the model for analyzing the 
impact of DoS attacks on the ACCUS ICP server is presented. In Section 4 the 
performance evaluation takes place in order to assess the impact of DoS attacks on the 
ACCUS ICP server. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2   DoS Attack Threat against ACCUS Smart City 
The ACCUS ICP targets at interconnecting many communicating entities 
geographically distributed over a heterogeneous communication network and 
handling different types of data derived from many different sources. These entities 
include urban subsystems (e.g., traffic and energy subsystems) and end-users’ devices 
(e.g., smartphones) supporting appropriate applications in the ACCUS Smart City, as 
in Fig. 1. As everything is interconnected through the ICP, any damage of it, due to 
DoS attacks, can severely affect not only the subsystems but also the end-users.  
Especially, the level of their severity can grow dramatically as attackers take 
advantage of the botnet technology. A botnet is a network of compromised machines 
(e.g., legitimate PCs, laptops), commonly referred to as bots, which are under the 
control of an attacker through central Command & Control (C&C) servers.  
 Fig. 1. ACCUS ICP server under DDoS Attack.  
Hence, the attacker is able to access and manage the botnet remotely via the central 
C&C servers. A depiction of a typical botnet architecture is included in Fig. 1. 
Botnets usually consist of several thousand bots and enable the attacker to launch 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks causing serious performance 
degradation on the victim’s side (e.g., web server). DDoS attacks are a variation of 
the typical DoS attacks, where a single attacking host targets a single victim. 
Particularly, in contrast to DoS attacks, DDoS attacks deploy multiple attacking 
entities (e.g., bots), often located in disparate locations, in order to achieve their goal. 
The multiple attacking entities and the fact that they can be located in different 
locations are two factors that make the detection and mitigation of these attacks more 
challenging. Besides, it is worthwhile to mention that the legitimate user of a bot has 
no knowledge that his/her machine has been compromised and is taking part in a 
DDoS attack [4], [5]. It turns out that the ACCUS ICP server’s protection is of 
paramount importance to guarantee reliability and security for ACCUS users. 
Due to the fact that the impact of DoS attacks on the victim’s performance is a key 
characteristic of them, it can be used as a feature for evaluation and accurate selection 
of existing defense mechanisms by the ACCUS ICP city planners. In this sense, the 
following section provides our analysis of the impact of this threat on the ACCUS 
ICP server.  
3   A Model for Analyzing DoS Attack Impact on ACCUS ICP  
The main objective of this section is to provide a model for analyzing the impact of 
DoS attacks on the queue management temporal performance of the ACCUS ICP 
server in terms of the system response time. To facilitate the understanding of the 
description of this work, we use queueing theory and emulate the ACCUS ICP server 
depicted in Fig. 1. For simplicity, we assume that the ACCUS ICP server is made up 
of k Central Processing Units (CPUs), a corresponding queue of size Q, and the 
Input/Output interfaces. This means that the ACCUS ICP server can accommodate a 
total number of N = Q + k queries, where k, N and Q are integers. In addition, i 
denotes a Poisson process-based request arrival rate for an incoming traffic i, which 
may originate from ACCUS subsystems (e.g., traffic monitoring subsystem), 
legitimate users (e.g. Smart Home) and a botnet commanded by an attacker (see Fig. 
1). Hence, the sum of i, denoted  (see Fig. 1), is also a Poisson process. Besides, we 
assume that each CPU has the same service rate .  
Basically, in this ACCUS ICP server model, a request arriving at the system is 
submitted to a CPU for processing. In case all the CPUs are busy, the request is 
placed in the queue and waits for its turn to be processed. When a higher priority 
request arrives in the ICP server, then a lower priority request currently getting 
service is pre-empted and the higher priority request gets service from the CPU. In the 
same way, an incoming lower priority request waits in the queue for service. Such 
birth-death processes of the ACCUS ICP server’s operations described herein above 
can be studied by using the M/M/k/N queueing model [6]. Hence, let Pn be the 
probability that exactly n requests are in the ACCUS ICP server. Thus, as described in 
[7], we express the steady-state distribution of requests into the ICP server as: 
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To obtain the mean response time denoted E[D], we first deduce the mean queue 
length denoted E[Q] by using the equation (1) and the work in [7] as follows: 
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In addition, let’s simplify the equation (2) further by considering the two cases of  = 
1 and   1 as follows: 
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From the equations (2) and (3), we have: 
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(4) 
By applying the equation (4) to Little’s formula, we obtain the mean response time 
E[D] imposed by the ICP server on incoming requests as: 
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4   Performance Evaluation  
In order to assess the impact of DoS attacks on the ACCUS ICP server we 
implemented the ICP model described earlier in this work (M/M/k/N model) in 
Matlab by configuring each CPU service rate  = 30 requests/(time unit) and the ICP 
server’s queue size Q = 400 requests. We simulated a DoS attack scenario (i.e., 
Distributed DoS attack) by increasing the overall request arrival rate, , from light 
traffic load perspective until the ICP is completely overloaded. The overloading 
occurs when  =  * k. In addition, we run the simulation for different number of 
CPUs (for k = 2, 3 and 4) so as to evaluate how increasing the processing capacity of 
the ICP server could alleviate the impact of DDoS attacks on the ACCUS service 
delivery performance. In this way, we are able to study the degradation of the 
ACCUS queue management temporal performance under DoS attacks.  
Thus, Fig. 2(a) shows that the mean response time increases with the increase of the 
request arrival rate, as we expected. Also, one can observe in Fig. 2(a) that, the 
response time improves with the increase of the number of CPUs in the ACCUS ICP. 
However, Fig. 2(b) warns that the queue utilization increases rapidly and reaches full 
utilization of 100%, regardless of the number of CPUs running in the ACCUS ICP 
server. This effectively demonstrates the negative impact that DoS attacks can impose 
on the ICP server even if one can keep increasing its capacity in an attempt to 
improve its performance. 
 
Fig. 2 . Mean Response Time (a) and Mean Queue Utilization (b).  
(a) (b) 
5   Conclusion and Future Work  
In this paper, we have focused our attention on the measurement of the performance 
degradation of the ACCUS ICP server imposed by DoS attacks, since it can be used 
by the ACCUS ICP city planners to evaluate existing defense mechanisms and select 
the most appropriate ones. Therefore, we modeled and analyzed the impact of DoS 
attacks on the queue management temporal performance of the ACCUS ICP server in 
terms of system delay by using queueing theory. As a result of this work, the mean 
response time and the mean queue utilization can be used as metrics for measuring the 
negative impact that DoS attacks can impose on the ACCUS ICP server’s 
performance.  
As future work, we plan to evaluate further, through a series of experiments, the mean 
response time and the mean queue utilization as metrics for accurate measurement of 
the performance degradation of the ACCUS ICP server due to DoS attacks. We also 
plan to use these metrics as parameters for the evaluation of existing defense 
mechanisms against DoS attacks.    
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